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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
particularly active in trademark matters.
Seventeen opinions,
covering topics as diverse as adult-oriented conversations and
mistaken identity, confirmed established precedent and provided
1
new insights.
The Federal Circuit set new standards for both
2
scandalous and geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks.
The court also considered the dilution doctrine in the face of the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue,
3
Inc. The Federal Circuit has thus provided trademark lawyers and
their clients with a wealth of guidance and change.
I.

SCANDALOUS MARKS: DICTIONARY EVIDENCE ALONE SUPPORTS A
REFUSAL TO REGISTER UNDER SECTION 2(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT

Although dictionaries have long held evidentiary value in
4
trademark cases, especially those involving refusals to register based
1. Cent. Mfg. Co. v. Casablanca Indus., Inc., No. 03-1294, 2003 WL 22977469
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2003); In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Nitro Leisure Prods., LLC v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d
1356, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re MBNA America Bank, N.A.,
340 F.3d 1328, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Pacer Tech., 338
F.3d 1348, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Custom Computer Servs.,
Inc. v. Paychex Props., Inc., 337 F.3d 1334, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1638 (Fed. Cir.
2003); In re Les Halles de Paris J.V., 334 F.3d 1371, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed.
Cir. 2003); Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 334 F.3d 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Savin Corp., No. 03-1094, 2003 WL 21316775
(Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003); Lowell Int’l Co. v. Quimby, No. 02-1392, 2003 WL 2138662
(Fed. Cir. June 4, 2003); Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc.,
330 F.3d 1333, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 958
(2003); In re California Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Nutting v. RAM Southwest, Inc., No. 02-1361, 2003 WL 2008072
(Fed. Cir. May 1, 2003); In re Anylens Acquisition, LLC, Nos. 02-1493, 02-1494, 2003
WL 1194293 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2003); In re Dayan, No. 02-1473, 2003 WL 932442
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2003); In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
2. See Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1341, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478 (finding
dictionary definitions sufficient to support refusal to register a “scandalous” mark
when the definitions of the mark categorize the word as vulgar and the applicant’s
use is limited to the vulgar meaning); see also California Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1340,
66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857 (holding that to deny an application for geographically
deceptively misdescriptiveness, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) now must also show that the goods-place association is material to the
consumer’s purchasing decision).
3. 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (holding that federal law requires proof of actual
dilution—rather than a likelihood of dilution—by objective proof of actual injury to
the economic value of the trademark).
4. See, e.g., In re American Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1832, 1836 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the PTO can meet its evidentiary
burden by relying on dictionary definitions); In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017,
1018-19, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (referencing dictionaries
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5

on scandalous marks, the Federal Circuit previously avoided
determining whether such evidence alone is sufficient to support a
6
refusal to register a mark under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act
when a term has no alternative meaning. Instead, past Federal
Circuit decisions left “for another day” whether refusals based on a
mark’s scandalous nature could be supported only by dictionary
7
evidence in the absence of alternative definitions. In In re Boulevard
8
Entertainment, Inc., the Federal Circuit finally resolved this open
9
question.
The applicant in Boulevard offered adult entertainment services,
specifically telephone services in which actors and actresses held
10
“adult” conversations with customers.
Boulevard provided these
services under the name “1-800-JACK-OFF” to over 1.2 million
11
customers per year. In 1998, Boulevard applied to register “1-800JACK-OFF” for telephone entertainment services and filed an intent12
to-use application for “JACK OFF” for the same services.
The
examining attorney refused to register these marks on the ground
13
that they included immoral and scandalous material.
The examining attorney relied on four dictionaries, all of which
defined “jack-off” as a vulgar and offensive reference to
14
masturbation.
Although Boulevard provided Lexis-Nexis search
results for “jack-off” to show that the mark was not vulgar, the
examining attorney disregarded that evidence as either unrelated or
15
as supportive of the offensive nature of the marks. On appeal, the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirmed, and
16
Boulevard timely appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.
The most important issue on appeal was whether the examining
attorney improperly relied upon only dictionary definitions when
17
refusing Boulevard’s applications. Although the Federal Circuit had
previously determined that dictionary definitions alone are
to determine whether the term “wipe” is a commonly used generic term).
5. See, e.g., In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1372-74, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1923, 1927-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (relying on dictionary definitions to establish
whether a mark constitutes scandalous matter under the Lanham Trademark Act).
6. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000).
7. Mavety, 33 F.3d 1367 at 1374, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
8. 334 F.3d 1336, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
9. Id. at 1340-41, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477-78.
10. Id. at 1338, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476-77.
11. Id. at 1339, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
12. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
13. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
14. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
15. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479.
16. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479.
17. Id. at 1340, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
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insufficient to support a section 2(a) refusal when a term has
18
multiple meanings, some of which are non-vulgar and pertinent, it
had not previously reached the issue of whether dictionary
definitions by themselves could be a sufficient basis for refusal when
there are no alternative, non-vulgar meanings. In light of the facts at
19
issue, the court answered this question in the affirmative.
Specifically, the court held that:
In a case such as this one, in which multiple dictionaries, including
at least one standard dictionary, uniformly indicate that a word is
vulgar, and the applicant’s use of the word is clearly limited to the
vulgar meaning of the word, . . . the PTO can sustain its burden of
showing that the mark comprises or consists of scandalous matter
by reference to dictionary definitions alone. In such instances,
although other evidence, such as consumer surveys, would no
doubt be instructive, the PTO’s finding is not legally insufficient
20
because of the absence of such evidence.

The court thus held that dictionary definitions alone are sufficient
to support a refusal under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) when the definitions
all categorize the word as vulgar and the applicant’s use is limited to
21
the vulgar meaning.
The court was also quick to distinguish the facts at issue in
Boulevard with those in In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., another wellknown Federal Circuit case that involved an application to register
the mark “BLACK TAIL” for an adult magazine featuring
photographs of partially and completely nude African American
22
women. The Boulevard court noted that the “BLACK TAIL” decision
involved a double entendre because the term could be understood as
either a vulgar reference to a female sexual partner or a non-vulgar
23
reference to buttocks.
The term “jack-off,” however, was not a
double entendre because all dictionary definitions noted that the
term was vulgar and Boulevard’s use of the term was “clearly limited
24
to the vulgar meaning,” and thus distinguishable from the use of the
25
term at issue in Mavety Media Group.
18. See In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1923, 1928 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding that the Board erroneously concluded that the
public would associate the applicant’s mark with its vulgar meaning rather than its
non-vulgar meaning).
19. Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1340-41, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478.
20. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478 (internal citations omitted).
21. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478.
22. Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1368-69, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923-24.
23. Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1341, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478.
24. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478.
25. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478.
The court also addressed several other issues. Boulevard argued that the
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The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Boulevard has provided muchneeded precedent in the area of scandalous and immoral marks.
With the holding that dictionary definitions alone may suffice for a
refusal in certain circumstances, the Federal Circuit has provided
more guidance to aid applicants in choosing and applying to register
questionable marks.
II. DILUTION AND PRIOR USE
Since Congress amended the Lanham Act in 1999 to allow
26
oppositions based on dilution, several issues have arisen regarding
when such oppositions are appropriate. In Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v.
27
Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., the Federal Circuit determined that,
before bringing an opposition based on dilution, a trademark owner
must demonstrate that its mark was famous prior to the applicant’s
28
use, even if the applicant’s use was limited to a specific geographic
29
area, and that state dilution law cannot be the basis for a dilution
30
opposition.
In Enterprise, Advantage Rent-A-Car produced a television
31
commercial in 1990 with the phrase “We’ll Even Pick You Up.”
Advantage aired the commercial approximately one hundred times

examining attorney relied on outdated dictionary definitions. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1478. To demonstrate that dictionary definitions are outdated and not
reflective of community standards, the court advised that applicants present either a
more current, “authoritative” dictionary that provides a different definition of the
meaning or acceptability of the word or to “make a persuasive showing” that the
dictionary definition does not reflect community views through “other” unspecified
evidence. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479. The court determined that Boulevard’s
evidence, which consisted of declarations of personal opinions as to the vulgarity of
the term and media references discussing masturbation in general and the term
“jerk-off,” was clearly insufficient. Id. at 1341-42, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479.
The court also addressed Boulevard’s argument that the examining attorney relied
on only a small percentage of Lexis-Nexis results without providing the search
criteria or noting that they were representative results. Id. at 1342, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1479. The court did not address this issue in depth, and simply noted that
any error was harmless. Id. at 1342-43, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479.
Finally, the court briefly addressed Boulevard’s First Amendment and Due Process
arguments before rejecting them. Id. at 1343, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1480.
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2000) (stating that a party may file an opposition to
registration based on dilution of the distinctiveness of the opposing party’s mark); see
also DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK: TACTICS AND PRACTICE 182 (3d ed.
1999) (defining dilution as the “use of a highly distinctive mark by someone other
than its owner in a manner that tends to blur its distinctiveness or tarnish its image”).
27. 330 F.3d 1333, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 958 (Dec. 15, 2003).
28. See id. at 1334-35, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
29. Id. at 1335, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
30. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813.
31. Id. at 1336, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813.
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in the San Antonio, Texas area from 1992 through 1995. Advantage
broadened the scope of the television commercial from August 1997
to April 1998 when it aired the commercial 289 more times in
33
Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas.
In 1994, Enterprise Rent-A-Car began a national advertising
campaign using similar slogans, such as “Pick the Company that Picks
34
You Up” and “Pick Enterprise, We’ll Pick You Up.” After two years’
use, Enterprise received trademark registrations for “PICK
ENTERPRISE, WE’LL PICK YOU UP,” “PICK THE COMPANY THAT
35
PICKS YOU UP,” and “WE’LL PICK YOU UP.”
After several years of use by both parties, Advantage sued
Enterprise in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas for unfair competition under federal and state law and for
36
cancellation of Enterprise’s registrations.
Enterprise responded
with a counterclaim for federal and state unfair competition and
37
trademark dilution. After the parties entered into a partial consent
judgment finding no likelihood of confusion regarding the unfair
38
competition claims, the district court ruled against Enterprise on its
dilution claims after determining that its trademarks were not
39
sufficiently famous under either federal or state law.
The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding on the federal dilution
claim but remanded the state dilution claim, holding that state law
40
required only distinctiveness, not fame.
During the district court litigation, Advantage filed a federal
41
trademark for the disputed “WE’LL EVEN PICK YOU UP” mark.
After the Fifth Circuit held that Enterprise’s marks were not famous
42
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”), the Board
dismissed Enterprise’s opposition and held that Enterprises’ FTDA
claim was barred by res judicata and that state law dilution laws are not
43
a proper basis for an opposition.
Enterprise appealed the decision on two main grounds, arguing
both that Advantage’s prior use in a limited geographical area should
32. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813.
33. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813.
34. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813.
35. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
36. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
37. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
38. Id. at 1337, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
39. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
40. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
41. Id. at 1336, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
42. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (protecting
famous marks from uses that dilute their distinctiveness).
43. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1337-38, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814-15.
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not prevent the opposition proceeding because Enterprise’s marks
44
had since achieved fame and that opposition proceedings can be
45
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
based on state dilution law.
Board’s decision and determined that neither of Enterprise’s
46
arguments were persuasive.
Enterprise’s main argument on appeal was that Advantage’s prior
use in a limited geographical area did not bar Enterprise’s opposition
proceeding because Enterprise’s marks had achieved fame after
47
1999. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and instead held
that “any prior use, even in a limited geographic area, defeats an
injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) [the dilution statute], and,
therefore, bars a claim of dilution as a ground for opposition under
48
section 1063.” This conclusion was supported, in the court’s view,
by the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), which allows owners of
famous marks to obtain “an injunction against another person’s
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use
49
begins after the mark has become famous . . . .” Because the FTDA
did not address suits based on limited geographic areas, the court
50
found that “such use” referred to any use in commerce.
To
successfully claim dilution under the FTDA, the court held that a
trademark owner must show that its mark was famous prior to any
51
use, even uses limited to specific geographic areas.
The court extended this analysis to the opposition proceedings,
52
noting that section 13 of the Lanham Act, the dilution opposition
provision, incorporated the dilution definition as provided in 15
53
U.S.C. § 1125(c). Specifically, the court stated that “[b]ecause there
can be no dilution under the FTDA where the allegedly famous mark
did not achieve fame prior to any use by the accused infringer, there
54
can be no opposition based on dilution under such circumstances.”
Enterprise also argued that it should be allowed to base its
55
opposition on state dilution grounds. The Federal Circuit, however,
44. Id. at 1341, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
45. Id. at 1344, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
46. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
47. Id. at 1341, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
48. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
50. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1342, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
51. See id. at 1343, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819 (basing this holding on both the
language of the statute and congressional intent).
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2000) (stating that opposition to registration may be
based on dilution as defined in Section 1125(c)).
53. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1343, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
54. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
55. See id. at 1344, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819 (arguing that the fame of the
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noted that section 13 of the Lanham Act provides for opposition
based on the FTDA and makes no mention of state dilution laws as a
56
Thus, the court concluded that the
ground for opposition.
language and history of the statute did not allow for oppositions
57
based on state dilution laws.
Enterprise is an important decision because it clearly limits
trademark owners’ rights to pursue dilution claims. Although not as
significant as the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Moseley v. V.
58
Secret Catalogue, Inc., Enterprise similarly saddles trademark owners
with a high burden to demonstrate dilution. Practitioners should
therefore pay close attention to this decision and the prior use, no
matter how limited, of junior users.
III. REFURBISHED GOODS
59

In Nitro Leisure Products, LLC v. Acushnet Co., the Federal Circuit
addressed the complex subject of refurbished goods, an area that has
not received much attention by the Federal Circuit in recent years.
The Federal Circuit was able to clarify what standards apply and why
refurbished goods should be treated differently than re-sold new
60
goods.
The dispute in Nitro began when Acushnet determined that Nitro
was selling both “recycled” and “refurbished” golf balls originally
manufactured by Acushnet under the “TITLEIST,” “ACUSHNET,”
61
“PINNACLE” and “PRO V1” marks. The recycled golf balls were
used balls in good condition that were simply washed and
repackaged.
The refurbished golf balls were subjected to a
procedure that stripped the paint and trademark markings, at which
62
point Nitro would reaffix the original manufacturer’s trademark.
Nitro also applied the statement “USED & REFURBISHED BY
SECOND CHANCE” or “USED AND REFURBISHED BY
63
GOLFBALLSDIRECT.COM” to each ball.
Nitro was rather

mark is not determinative in some state dilution statutes).
56. See id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819-20 (noting legislative history supports
the conclusion that state laws cannot form the basis of a dilution opposition).
57. Id. at 1344-45, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819-20.
58. 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2002) (holding among other things that the FTDA
requires a showing of actual dilution as opposed to a likelihood of dilution).
59. 341 F.3d 1356, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
60. Id. at 1360-65, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817-20.
61. Id. at 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
62. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
63. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
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successful in its sale of used golf balls, with annual sales of ten million
64
dollars in 2001.
Nitro initiated the suit and filed a complaint in the Southern
65
District of Florida for unfair competition. Acushnet responded with
a suit in the Central District of California alleging patent and
66
The
trademark infringement, as well as trademark dilution.
67
California case was eventually consolidated with the Florida case.
Acushnet moved for a preliminary injunction regarding only Nitro’s
68
sale of the refurbished balls, which the district court denied. At
issue before the Federal Circuit was Acushnet’s appeal of the denial
of the preliminary injunction on trademark infringement and
69
dilution grounds.
Acushnet’s main argument on appeal was that the district court
70
applied an erroneous standard for trademark infringement.
Specifically, Acushnet contended that the district court misapplied
71
the Supreme Court’s decision in Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders
and erroneously failed to apply the Eleventh Circuit’s “material
difference” test, enumerated in Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD
72
International Corp. Acushnet claimed that the Davidoff decision, if
properly applied, would have required the district court to analyze
whether the original and refurbished goods were “materially
different,” an analysis it claimed would have clearly demonstrated
73
that Nitro’s refurbishing activities were unlawful.
74
The court did not agree with Acushnet’s analysis. After citing the
75
traditional likelihood of confusion factors, the court reviewed the
64. See id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815 (noting that, of the $10 million in total
sales, $4.8 million resulted from the sale of refurbished balls).
65. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
66. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
67. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
68. Id. at 1358-59, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
69. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
70. Id. at 1359, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816. Because this was an appeal from a
court within the Eleventh Circuit, the court relied on Eleventh Circuit law. Id., 67
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
71. 331 U.S. 125 (1947) (holding that used and refurbished goods may be sold
under the trademark of the original manufacturer so long as the alleged infringer
attempts to restore the original condition of the goods and full disclosure is made
about the true nature of the goods).
72. 263 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that a trademark was infringed
when a party unrelated to the trademark owner sold genuinely trademarked goods in
altered packaging).
73. See Nitro, 341 F.3d at 1361, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817 (noting that
Acushnet argued that the “material difference” test used to determine the likelihood
of confusion in the sale of new goods should also be used to determine if a
trademark has been infringed in the sale of used goods).
74. Id. at 1363, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819-20.
75. See id. at 1360, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. In Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Int’l
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76

Champion case. In Champion, the Supreme Court noted that sellers
of used goods may keep the trademark of the original manufacturer
on the product without deceiving the public if the seller had made all
possible efforts to restore the product and made full disclosure of the
77
product’s condition. Although the Court in Champion determined
that there was no traditional likelihood of confusion on the facts of
78
that case, it also noted that: “[c]ases may be imagined where the
reconditioning or repair would be so extensive or so basic that it
would be a misnomer to call the article by its original name, even
79
though the words ‘used’ or ‘repaired’ were added.” The Court held
that there was no infringement because the defendant in Champion
did not provide a new design for the product and had only attempted
80
to restore the product.
The Federal Circuit next turned to the Davidoff “material
81
difference” test. Unlike Champion, Davidoff involved the limitation
82
of resale of new, genuine goods. The Davidoff decision examined
the differences between the resold goods and the original goods,
83
which consisted of the obliteration of batch codes on packaging.
Davidoff determined that the alterations to the packaging were
“material differences,” and the defendant was thus liable for
84
trademark infringement.
After reviewing both Champion and Davidoff, the Federal Circuit
found that the context of a case—the resale of new goods versus the
resale of used goods—determined when a court should use the
Champion analysis as opposed to the Davidoff “material differences”

Select Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1335, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447, 1449 (11th Cir.
1999), the court adopted the following seven factors to assess the likelihood of
consumer confusion: type of mark; similarity of mark; similarity of the products the
marks represent; similarity of the parties’ retail outlets (trade channels) and
customers; similarity of advertising media; defendant’s intent; and actual confusion.
76. Nitro, 341 F.3d at 1361-62, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
77. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947) (noting
that the original manufacturer is not harmed as long as it is not associated with the
inferior quality of the used goods).
78. See id. at 126 (noting that the infringer sold repaired spark plugs with the
original manufacturer’s brand still affixed to them as well as a “Renewed” label).
79. Id. at 129.
80. Id.
81. See Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir.
2001) (holding that a trademark is infringed when materially different goods are
sold under that mark because of the resulting consumer confusion).
82. See id. at 1299 (alleging that the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s trademark
by reselling its products in the original container with the batch number removed).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 1302-03 (finding that the etching on the bottle where the batch code
had been was likely to cause consumer confusion).
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test.
Although the court acknowledged the importance of the
Davidoff “material differences” test in the context of resale of new
goods, the court applied the Champion test in the context of
refurbished goods: “whether the used or refurbished goods are so
different from the original that it would be a misnomer for them to
86
After reviewing the
be designated by the original trademark.”
district court’s application of the Champion analysis to the facts at
issue, the court determined that the refurbished golf balls were not
sufficiently different from original golf balls to warrant a finding of
87
trademark infringement.
In stark contrast, Judge Newman issued a strong dissent. Judge
Newman relied on the damage done by Nitro’s refurbishing process
and stated that, although Nitro argued that the differences were not
great, “that is not the issue. Trademarks are an indication of quality,
on which the consumer can rely. The consumer is no less deceived if
he does not know that the product is inferior, or if the extent of the
88
inferiority is not great.” Moreover, Judge Newman disagreed with
the court’s determination that the notice would aid consumers,
stating that “[w]hen the defects are concealed, that is not ‘full
disclosure about the true nature’ of the golf balls . . . . Concealment
89
is the antithesis of full disclosure.” This, however, was not the view
of the majority, which felt that while the trademarks were used on the
refurbished golf balls, they were used on a product that was so
90
different that it would not constitute trademark infringement.
IV. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
In 2003, the Federal Circuit issued several opinions involving
likelihood of confusion. While application of the likelihood of
confusion factors is not groundbreaking, it does provide insight into
how applicants should proceed in the examination phase.
A. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.
91

In In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., the Federal Circuit explored the
92
factors enumerated in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., and
85. See Nitro Leisure Prods., LLC v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362-63, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that purchasers of used goods
have different expectations than purchasers of new products).
86. Id. at 1363, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
87. Id. at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
88. Id. at 1366, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (Newman, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1369, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824.
90. Id. at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
91. 315 F.3d 1311, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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provided more guidance on how to approach a refusal to register
93
under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.
Majestic Distilling involved Majestic’s attempt to register the mark
94
“RED BULL” for tequila.
Upon review, the examining attorney
determined that the mark was not registrable because there was a
likelihood of confusion between “RED BULL” for tequila and the
95
registered mark “RED BULL” for Scotch whiskey and malt liquor.
Although Majestic successfully petitioned for cancellation of the
“RED BULL” mark for Scotch whiskey, both the examining attorney
and the Board, on appeal, found that there was in fact a likelihood of
96
confusion between “RED BULL” for tequila and for malt liquor.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed and addressed each of the
97
DuPont likelihood of confusion factors raised by the parties. First,
the court noted that Majestic’s mark was identical to one of the marks
for use with malt liquor and “almost identical” to another “RED
98
BULL” mark.
Moreover, the court reaffirmed that “when word
marks are identical but neither suggestive nor descriptive of the
goods associated with them, the first DuPont factor weighs heavily
99
against the applicant.” Similarly, because tequila and malt liquor
are both alcoholic beverages marketed in the same channels of trade,
the second and third DuPont factors, which refer to the similarity of
100
the goods and trade channels, also weighed against Majestic.
The court was more thorough in its analysis of the fourth factor,
sophistication of the purchaser and customer. The court recognized
that while both tequila and malt liquor are inexpensive and likely
92. 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
The thirteen Dupont Factors are: (1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in
their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression;
(2) the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use;
(3) the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels;
(4) the conditions under which, and buyers to whom, sales are made; (5) the fame of
the prior mark; (6) the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods;
(7) the nature and extent of any actual confusion; (8) the length of time during, and
conditions, under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual
confusion; (9) the variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used; (10) the market
interface between an applicant and the owner of a prior mark; (11) the extent to
which an applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods;
(12) the extent of potential confusion; and (13) any other established fact probative
of the effect of use.
93. See Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000).
94. Majestic Distilling, 315 F.3d at 1311, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201.
95. Id. at 1314, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201-03.
96. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202-03.
97. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202-03.
98. Id. at 1315, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
99. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
100. Id. at 1316, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
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“impulse” buys, many consumers are very brand-conscious regarding
101
alcoholic beverages. Ultimately, the court determined that Majestic
did not provide sufficient evidence to support this likelihood of
102
confusion factor, specifically noting the absence of survey data.
The court next turned to the fifth and seventh factors, the fame of
103
The court simply noted
the prior mark and actual confusion.
Majestic’s lack of evidence that the “RED BULL” mark for use with
malt liquor was not famous and stated that, even if there was such
evidence, a lack of fame would not preclude a finding of likelihood of
104
confusion.
Similarly, in reference to the seventh factor, the court
briefly noted that, although there was little evidence of actual
confusion, such a “lack of evidence carries little weight, especially in
105
an ex parte context.”
Majestic’s argument apparently relied heavily on the sixth, eighth,
and tenth factors, which involve the number of similar marks used on
similar goods, the length of time of concurrent use without actual
confusion, and the “market interface between the applicant and the
106
owner of the prior mark,” respectively. Majestic noted that there
were no incidents of actual confusion during its use of the “RED
107
BULL” mark, which lasted for sixteen years, and that the Stroh
Brewery Company, the owner of the “RED BULL” mark for malt
liquor, had acknowledged that its mark could be used concurrently
with the Scotch whiskey mark and had entered into agreements with
108
third parties regarding the mark.
However, these arguments did
not persuade the court, which found that the agreements between
the “RED BULL” mark for malt liquor and for Scotch whiskey were
109
dated and limited to preclude use of the mark on beer or ale.
After methodically reviewing the likelihood of confusion factors at
110
issue, the court affirmed the Board’s decision.
Majestic Distilling is
thus a study of how the Federal Circuit applies the DuPont factors.

101. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
102. Id. at 1316-17, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204-05.
103. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
104. Id. at 1317, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
105. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205 (internal citation omitted).
106. Id. at 1315, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
107. Id. at 1318, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
108. Id. at 1317, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
109. See id. at 1318, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205-06 (illustrating how the age of
an agreement could limit the agreement’s value when using it as a DuPont indicator).
110. See id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207 (holding that consumers could be
mistakenly led to believe that the different products could come from the same
entity, therefore constituting confusion).
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B. In re Coors Brewing Co.
Courts and the Board often analyze whether different goods or
services are sufficiently related under the DuPont factors to weigh in
favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion. In In re Coors Brewing
111
Co., the Federal Circuit addressed this issue and reinforced its
holding that the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) must show
“something more” than that different goods are in the same
environment to demonstrate that the goods are sufficiently related to
112
weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Unfortunately, the court declined to provide specific examples or
guidance.
Coors Brewing involved Coors’s 1998 application for registration of
113
the “BLUE MOON and design” mark for use with beer. Coors had
previously applied to register the word mark “BLUE MOON,” but
registration was refused based on section 2(d) likelihood of
114
confusion grounds.
After the first refusal, Coors combined the
“BLUE MOON” word mark with a design, which reflected a forest
scene in the bottom half, the words “Blue Moon” across the center of
the design, and a large moon covering the majority of the top half of
115
the design. The words “Blue Moon Brewing Co.” were also present
116
at the bottom of the design in small font. The examining attorney
again refused the application, citing a likelihood of confusion with
the mark “BLUE MOON and Design” for restaurant services and with
117
two “BLUE MOON” marks for use with wine.
The examining
attorney determined that the marks were similar in sound,
appearance, and commercial impression and that beer and
restaurant services were “closely related” because brew pubs often
provide restaurant services, some restaurants sell private label beer,
and several third parties had registered marks for both beer and
118
restaurant services.
The examining attorney contended that beer
and wine are sufficiently related because both products are sold
119
through the same channels to the same classes of purchasers.

111.
2003).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059 (Fed. Cir.
See id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
Id. at 1341, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
Id. at 1344, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062.
Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062.
Id. at 1341-42, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060-61.
Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
Id. at 1342, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
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Coors promptly appealed the examining attorney’s refusal. The
Board rejected the examining attorney’s determination that beer and
wine are sufficiently related, but accepted that beer and restaurant
services are sufficiently related because, as noted by the examining
attorney, brew pubs often serve as restaurants, some restaurants sell
private label beer, and some marks have been obtained for both
121
restaurant services and beer.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Coors contended, among other
things, that the marks were not similar and that beer and restaurant
services are not sufficiently related to weigh in favor of finding
122
likelihood of confusion. The court first addressed whether the two
marks were similar. Although both marks included full moons and
the words “Blue Moon,” the court held that the marks were actually
123
“quite different.”
Because the marks involved significant
differences, the court determined that similarity was a “less important
124
factor” in the likelihood of confusion analysis.
The court also examined Coors’s other main argument, i.e., that
beer and restaurant services are not sufficiently related to weigh in
125
favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Citing Jacobs v.
126
the court reaffirmed that “‘[t]o
International Multifoods Corp.,
establish likelihood of confusion a party must show something more
than that similar or even identical marks are used for food products
127
and for restaurant services.’” The evidence relied on by the Board,
which included several references to restaurants providing private
label beer, articles about brew pubs that brew beer and offer
restaurant services, and several third-party registrations for beer and
restaurant services, was not the “something more” required by
128
Jacobs.
Moreover, Coors further demonstrated the lack of
“something more” by producing evidence that well under one
percent of restaurants were brew pubs, that there was no evidence
120. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
121. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
122. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
123. Id. at 1344, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062.
124. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062.
125. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062. The court also affirmed the Board’s
finding that the “Blue Moon” mark was not weak and determined that the large
number of third-party uses prevented the mark from being considered strong. Id. at
1345, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062-63.
126. 668 F.2d 1234, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that just
because restaurants serve food and beverages does not mean that all food and
beverages are related to restaurant services for purposes of likelihood of confusion).
127. Coors, 343 F.3d at 1345, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063 (quoting Jacobs, 668
F.2d at 1236) (emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 1346, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063.
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that a significant amount of restaurants offered private label beer,
and that it was actually unusual for one mark to be registered for
129
The court thus reversed the Board’s
both beer and restaurants.
decision upholding the examining attorney’s refusal and remanded
130
the case for consideration consistent with the opinion.
This opinion reaffirms the Jacobs test and also provides much131
needed examples of the amorphous “something more” standard.
While the court failed to provide more specific guidance,
practitioners can look to Coors Brewing to assess the quantum of
evidence necessary to overcome a section 2(d) likelihood of
confusion based on a perceived similarity of services.
V. GEOGRAPHICALLY DECEPTIVELY MISDESCRIPTIVENESS
The Federal Circuit’s decisions in a pair of cases involving
geographically deceptively misdescriptiveness are among the most
important trademark decisions of 2003. These decisions reshaped
the standard for geographically deceptively misdescriptiveness in
light of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and
132
its implementing legislation. Although earlier post-NAFTA Federal
133
Circuit decisions employed the pre-NAFTA standard, in these cases
the Federal Circuit clearly laid down a new standard by which
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks should be judged.
A. In re California Innovations, Inc.
The Federal Circuit first addressed the interplay between
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks and NAFTA in In re
134
California Innovations, Inc.
The applicant in California Innovations
filed an intent-to-use application for “CALIFORNIA INNOVATIONS”
in reference to various products, including automobile visor
135
organizers and backpacks.
Although the examining attorney
allowed the mark to be published for opposition, the PTO

129. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063.
130. Id. at 1347, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
131. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
132. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605; NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, TEXTS OF AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTING BILL,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R.
DOC. NO. 103-159, at 154 (1993).
133. In re Save Venice New York, Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778
(Fed. Cir. 2001); see In re Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
134. 329 F.3d 1334, 1340-41, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853, 1857-58 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
135. Id. at 1336, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
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subsequently reasserted jurisdiction and refused registration on the
136
basis that the mark was geographically deceptively misdescriptive.
Prior to NAFTA, sections 2(e) and (f) of the Lanham Act allowed
both primarily geographically descriptive and deceptively
misdescriptive marks to be registered on the Supplemental Register,
and, upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness, on the Principal
137
Register.
Furthermore, the test for geographically deceptively
misdescriptive marks required a showing that the primary
significance of the mark was a generally known geographic location
and that the public likely would think that the goods came from that
138
location, when, in fact, the goods originated from a different area.
This test thus included the so-called “goods-place” association
139
requirement.
The Federal Circuit determined that “NAFTA and its
implementing legislation obliterated the distinction between
geographically deceptive marks and primarily geographically
140
deceptively misdescriptive marks.”
Specifically, the court
determined that the NAFTA amendments prohibited geographically
deceptively misdescriptive marks from registration, regardless of
141
acquired distinctiveness.
Because the PTO can no longer rely on
lack of distinctiveness as the basis for refusal, the court found that the
PTO must instead demonstrate that geographically deceptively
142
misdescriptive marks are, in fact, deceptive.
The court stated that
the PTO now must also show that the goods-place association is
143
material to the consumer’s purchasing decision.
To deny
registration on geographically deceptively misdescriptiveness
grounds, the PTO must therefore show:
136. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
137. Id. at 1337, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. The Principal Register is the
primary registry of trademarks maintained by the PTO. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072
(2000). In order to qualify for registration on the Principal Register, a trademark
must be distinctive and currently in use. See id. § 1052(c). Certain marks which are
not eligible for registration on the Principal Register, but which are capable of
distinguishing an applicant’s goods or services, are registered at the PTO on the
Supplemental Register. See id. §§ 1091-1096. Those marks which are registered on
the Supplemental Register are excluded from receiving the advantages of certain
sections of the Trademark Act of 1946. See id. § 1094.
138. California Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1340, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
139. See id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857 (describing the “goods-place
association” as the association between the goods in question and location where the
potential confusion could occur).
140. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
141. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
142. Id. at 1340, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
143. See id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857-58 (noting that this newly heightened
test of materiality inquiry “equates this test with the elevated standard applied under
§ 1052(a)”).
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(1) the primary significance of the mark is a generally known
geographic location; (2) the consuming public is likely to believe
the place identified by the mark indicates the origin of the goods
bearing the mark, when in fact the goods do not come from that
place; and (3) the misrepresentation was a material factor in the
144
consumer’s decision.

Because the Board had not applied this new test, the court
145
remanded the case.
The court recognized that it had issued two decisions regarding
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks since NAFTA without
146
providing a new test.
The court, however, determined that those
two decisions also satisfied the new post-NAFTA test because they
both discussed the relationship between the geographic locations at
147
issue and the products.
B. In re Les Halles de Paris J.V.
Only two months later, the Federal Circuit applied its new test to
services and placed a higher burden on the PTO to demonstrate that
a mark was unregistrable as geographically deceptively misdescriptive
148
in the services context. In In re Les Halles de Paris J.V., the court was
faced with the PTO’s decision to refuse registration of the mark “LE
149
MARAIS” for restaurant services. Both the examining attorney and
the Board determined that the mark was geographically deceptively
150
misdescriptive based on the pre-California Innovations standard.
The Board relied on evidence that a Jewish quarter of Paris is known
as “Le Marais” and found that, especially in light of Les Halles’ use of
the term in relation to a French restaurant, consumers were likely to
151
associate the restaurant with the “Le Marais” region of Paris.
The
Board specifically noted that it was not making a finding that the “Le
152
Marais” neighborhood was known for cuisine.
On appeal, the court determined that the second prong of the
California Innovations analysis would have to be modified in the
153
services context. In the context of goods, the California Innovations
test allows an inference that the consumer associates the product with
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 1341, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
Id. at 1342-43, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
Id. at 1340-41, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
334 F.3d 1371, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1372, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540.
Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540.
Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540.
Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540.
Id. at 1373-74, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541-42.
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the geographic location if consumers identify the geographic location
154
Because consumers generally
as a known source of the product.
receive services at the business itself, they are more likely to be aware
that the services do not originate in the geographic location of the
mark, thereby rendering the inference inapplicable with regard to
155
services. The court therefore held that, when dealing with services,
the PTO “must show that patrons will likely be misled to make some
meaningful connection between the restaurant (the service) and the
156
relevant place.”
Examples include evidence that consumers
thought that the food was imported from the “Le Marais” region or
that the restaurant’s chefs received specialized training in the “Le
157
Marais” region, among other things.
The court also noted that the PTO must demonstrate the third
prong of the California Innovations analysis: that the misleading
158
services-place association is material.
To satisfy the materiality
prong, the court stated that the PTO must make “some heightened
association between the services and the relevant geographic
159
denotation.”
The court noted that “an inference of materiality
160
arises in the event of a very strong services-place association.”
Without a very strong services-place association, the PTO must
161
Since the Board did not
present direct evidence of materiality.
apply the heightened standard for geographically deceptively
162
misdescriptive goods, the court remanded the case.
VI. MERE DESCRIPTIVENESS
The Federal Circuit also issued one published and several
unpublished decisions focusing on the issue of mere descriptiveness;
163
164
namely, In re MBNA America Bank, N.A., In re Dayan, In re Anylens
165
166
MBNA America Bank and
Acquisition, LLC, and In re Savin Corp.
Dayan involved a traditional distinction between descriptive and
167
suggestive marks, while both Anylens and Savin involved the use of
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 1374, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541.
Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541-42.
Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
Id. at 1375, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541-42.
Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541-42.
340 F.3d 1328, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
No. 02-1473, 2003 WL 932442 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2003).
Nos. 02-1493, 02-1494, 2003 WL 1194293 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2003).
No. 03-1094, 2003 WL 21316775 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003).
MBNA America Bank, 340 F.3d at 1332, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780; Dayan,

HORTON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

928

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/20/2004 3:24 PM

[Vol. 53:909

Internet terms such as “com” and “net” as descriptive portions of
168
proposed marks. Anylens also dealt with geographic terms used on
169
the Internet.
A. In re MBNA America Bank, N.A.
MBNA America Bank focused on the distinction between descriptive
170
and suggestive marks in the registration process.
MBNA filed two
intent-to-use applications for “MONTANA SERIES” and
171
“PHILADELPHIA CARD” in connection with credit card services.
The examining attorney refused to register the marks as merely
172
descriptive of MBNA’s goods and services.
The Board affirmed,
noting that MBNA’s credit cards could be categorized as “regional
affinity” cards, which attempt to appeal to customers in particular
173
geographic regions.
Since the marks described the region, and
hence a significant feature of MBNA’s services, the Board agreed that
174
the marks were merely descriptive and thus unregistrable.
MBNA appealed, claiming that the marks were suggestive, but the
175
Federal Circuit found its arguments unpersuasive. MBNA claimed
that the “MONTANA SERIES” and “PHILADELPHIA CARD” marks
were either arbitrary or suggestive because they did not immediately
convey credit card information, such as interest rates and the annual
176
fee. The court found that the marks described regional pride and
177
loyalty, which are significant features of “regional affinity” cards.
The Federal Circuit thus agreed with the Board’s determination that
the marks were merely descriptive in regard to MBNA’s credit card
178
services.
Chief Judge Mayer issued a dissenting opinion, observing that
MBNA was attempting to register the marks for credit card services,
179
not credit cards with scenes of Montana or Philadelphia.

2003 WL 932442, at *1.
168. Anylens, 2003 WL 1194293, at *1; Savin, 2003 WL 21316775, at **1-3.
169. Anylens, 2003 WL 1194293, at *2.
170. MBNA America Bank, 340 F.3d at 1329, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779-80.
171. Id. at 1331, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
172. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
173. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
174. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779-81.
175. See id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
176. Id. at 1333, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
177. Id. at 1334, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
178. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
179. Id. at 1332, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting) (arguing
that the evidence does not support the finding that the relevant marks are merely
descriptive of recited services).
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B. In re Dayan
180

In the unpublished decision In re Dayan, the court was faced with
an intent-to-use application for the mark “BABY GOLF” for “clothing,
namely newborn, infant and toddler shirts, one-piece outfits,
181
coveralls, pants and dresses.” The examining attorney refused the
registration as merely descriptive, and the Board agreed, affirming
182
the refusal.
The Board noted that the word “baby,” which was
disclaimed apart from the entire mark, was obviously descriptive and
that Dayan’s category was sufficiently broad to include so-called “golf
183
shirts.”
On appeal, Dayan contended that despite selling polo shirts, the
Board lacked substantial evidence that polo shirts are also known as
184
“golf shirts.”
The court concurred with the Board, noting that
Dayan’s identification of goods was broad enough to cover “golf-style
185
clothing” and “golf shirts.” The court also found that the Board did
rely on substantial evidence for the proposition that polo shirts are
also commonly known as golf shirts, including a catalogue sheet for
186
golf shirts and a magazine article.
Dayan also argued that the “BABY GOLF” mark was incongruous
187
and thus not merely suggestive. Dayan claimed that “BABY GOLF”
was incongruous because the idea of babies playing golf is, in fact, a
188
fanciful notion.
The court disagreed and determined that no
“mental pause” was required to understand that “BABY GOLF” is for
189
golf-styled clothing for babies.
C. In re Anylens Acquisition, LLC
190

In another unpublished decision, In re Anylens Acquisition, LLC,
the Federal Circuit addressed Anylens’s intent-to-use application for
“NATIONAL CONTACTS.COM” and “NATIONAL CONTACT
180. No. 02-1473, 2003 WL 932442 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2003).
181. Id. at *1.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at **1-2.
187. See id. at *6. Incongruity is a concept commonly used by the Board and
federal courts to explain the often-difficult determination of whether a mark is
merely descriptive or suggestive. Id. Incongruity simply encompasses the idea that,
when a term includes certain words not commonly used together, thus requiring
imagination and “mental pause,” the term is more likely suggestive, rather than
descriptive. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *7.
190. Nos. 02-1493, 02-1494, 2003 WL 1194293 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2003).
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LENSES.COM” for “on-line retail store services, mail order services,
and retail stores featuring contact lenses, eyeglasses, and
191
The examining attorney refused to register either
accessories.”
192
mark on descriptiveness grounds. The Board affirmed, stating that
the marks immediately conveyed information about Anylens’s
services because “contacts” and “contact lenses” described some of
Anylens’s services, the term “national” extended beyond the
geographic boundaries in which the services were offered, and the
term “.com” was a mere reference to a top level domain
193
designation.
Anylens disputed the Board’s finding on several grounds. First,
Anylens claimed that the Board inappropriately “dissect[ed]” the
194
marks instead of viewing them in their entirety.
The Federal
Circuit, however, held that to determine descriptiveness, it is
appropriate to discern the meaning of the individual words that
195
comprise the mark.
Moreover, when viewing the words together,
196
the court found that the mark was still merely descriptive.
Anylens’s next contention was that the term “national” did not
197
describe the geographic scope of its services.
Instead, Anylens
claimed that it used the term “national” to identify itself with the
198
Again, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument. The
nation.
court stated that, while the source of Anylens’s goods may not be
199
national, the goods may be available nationwide. The court noted
that Anylens did not dispute the nationwide scope of its services and
that registration under the Lanham Act provides “nationwide
200
exclusivity” for the mark.
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Anylens’s creative argument
that the terms “.com” and “national” are incongruous because “.com”
describes a worldwide scope whereas “national” is more
201
geographically limited.
The definition of “.com,” in the court’s
view, involves a commercial organization and not a geographic
202
scope.
Because the two terms did not represent conflicting

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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geographic scopes, the court refused to hold that they were
203
204
incongruous. The court thus affirmed the Board’s findings.
D. In re Savin Corp.
205

In re Savin Corp. is yet another unpublished decision involving the
descriptiveness of a mark. Savin filed an intent-to-use application for
“SAVIN NET” for a “computer software system for processing parts
and supplies orders via a real-time on-line system, namely, software
generating a graphical user interface that is downloadable by
customers for use in communicating with the vendor” and
“computerized on-line ordering services in the field of office
206
machinery and equipment.” The examining attorney required that
Savin disclaim “NET” because it was merely descriptive of on-line
207
systems.
In response, Savin contended that “NET” was not
descriptive because its services were provided through phone lines
208
and not a global network. The examining attorney maintained that
the mark was merely descriptive and relied on on-line dictionaries
stating that “NET” refers to networks connected by telephones and
209
Savin’s own brochure, which referenced its “on-line” system.
When Savin appealed, the Board upheld the examining attorney’s
210
disclaimer requirement.
The Board relied on the dictionary
definitions and noted that Savin’s system was for the transmission of
data over phone lines, thus rendering the “NET” portion of the mark
211
merely descriptive.
On appeal, the court reiterated that to be merely descriptive, a
mark “‘would immediately convey to one seeing or hearing it the
212
thought of appellant’s services.’”
The dictionary definitions along
with Savin’s brochure description convinced the court that the “NET”
213
portion of the mark did immediately convey part of Savin’s services.
The court also rejected Savin’s argument that, because the term “net”
has several meanings, it could not immediately convey information
214
about the company’s services. Instead, the court noted that, while
203. Id.
204. Id. at *4.
205. No. 03-1094, 2003 WL 21316775 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003).
206. Id. at *1.
207. Id.
208. Id. at *2.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 159, 229 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 818, 819 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
213. Id. at *3.
214. Id.
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there are various types of networks, they are all networks and any
215
other definition of “net” was irrelevant to Savin’s services.
VII. INHERENTLY DISTINCTIVE TRADE DRESS
Courts have struggled with the scope of inherently distinctive trade
216
dress since Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. changed the legal
landscape and subjected trade dress to the traditional distinctiveness
217
218
factors. In In re Pacer Technology, the Federal Circuit addressed the
PTO’s evidentiary burden in showing that a particular trade dress is
219
not inherently distinctive. Specifically, the court analyzed whether
the PTO must show evidence that consumers actually associated the
220
trade dress with the applicant.
The applicant in Pacer applied to register a specific design for a
221
container cap. After reviewing the design, the examining attorney
issued a non-final action finding that the design was not inherently
222
distinctive.
In response, Pacer produced five consumer affidavits
223
The
claiming that the cap design indicated Pacer as the source.
examining attorney continued to refuse the registration and
included, as further support, ten registered U.S. design patents with
224
designs similar to Pacer’s.
Pacer appealed the examining attorney’s refusal to the Board,
225
which affirmed.
The Board explained that the design patent
evidence was “probative of the fact that consumers are not likely to
find applicant’s claimed feature . . . to be at all unique, original or
226
peculiar in appearance.” The fact that several of the design patents
were registered by Pacer’s competitors further bolstered the Board’s
227
decision.

215. Id. at *4.
216. 505 U.S. 763, 776, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1086 (1992) (holding that
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not require “proof of secondary meaning . . .
where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive”).
217. See id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084 (explaining the general rule to
determine distinctiveness: “An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being
protected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness
through secondary meaning.”) (internal quotation omitted).
218. 338 F.3d 1348, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
219. Id. at 1349, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
220. Id. at 1351, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631-32.
221. Id. at 1349, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
222. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
223. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
224. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
225. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
226. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
227. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
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The main issue on appeal was whether the PTO established a prima
facie case of lack of inherent distinctiveness, or, instead, whether the
PTO was required to show that the patented designs were actually
228
used in the relevant market. In light of its decisions in In re Loew’s
229
230
Theatres, Inc. and In re Gyulay, the court determined that the PTO
must only show a “reasonable predicate” that the patented designs
231
were advertised, sold, or used, not that there was actual use.
The
court noted that the PTO does not have the resources to show actual
use, which would likely require expensive evidence such as consumer
232
surveys.
Instead, the court found that the applicant was in the
better position to demonstrate lack of actual use when attempting to
233
rebut the PTO’s prima facie case.
The court determined that Pacer failed to provide sufficient
234
evidence to rebut the PTO’s prima facie case.
Pacer only provided
five consumer affidavits, all of which were very similar and conclusory
and none of which explained why Pacer’s cap design was distinct
235
from designs on competing products. The court therefore affirmed
the Board and the examining attorney’s refusal to register the
236
container cap.
VIII. MONETARY DAMAGES
The Federal Circuit decided two trademark cases in 2003 involving
237
monetary damages.
Both of these decisions held that the district
courts had abused their discretion in awarding certain damages
under the Lanham Act and modified or reversed those awards.

228. Id. at 1350, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631.
229. 769 F.2d 764, 767-68, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 865, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(affirming the PTO’s denial to register “DURANGO” as a mark for chewing tobacco,
when such a mark would be “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive”).
230. 820 F.2d 1216, 1218, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1009, 1010-11 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(holding that the term “APPLE PIE,” used to describe the scent of potpourri, was not
registrable under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act because “APPLE PIE” is merely
descriptive of the scent of the potpourri and did not convey any “secondary
meaning”).
231. Pacer, 338 F.3d at 1351, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632.
232. Id. at 1352, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632.
233. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632-33.
234. Id. at 1353, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633.
235. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633.
236. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633.
237. Nutting v. RAM Southwest, Inc., No. 02-1361, 2003 WL 2008072 (Fed. Cir.
May 1, 2003); Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp., 334 F.3d 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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A. Nutting v. RAM Southwest, Inc.
In the first of these cases, Nutting v. RAM Southwest, Inc., an
unpublished decision, the Federal Circuit took a big “bite” out of the
238
district court’s damages award. This case involved the defendants’
continued distribution, after the plaintiff’s termination of
defendants’ distributorship, of plaintiff’s artificial fangs under the
239
“PROFESSIONAL FANGTASTICS” mark.
The plaintiff, Donald
Nutting, sued the defendants for false designation of origin under
240
241
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, among other things.
After a
jury found the defendants liable for false designation of origin, the
242
district court trebled all of the jury’s Lanham Act damages awards.
More specifically, the lower court awarded the defendants’ profits,
trebled, plus the cost of corrective advertising, trebled, as damages
for the Lanham Act violations, along with attorney’s fees, costs, and
243
prejudgment interest.
The Federal Circuit found that the district court’s post-verdict
award of the defendants’ profits, trebled, constituted an abuse of
244
discretion and modified the award.
The court first noted that
245
section 35(a) of the Lanham Act does not expressly provide for the
trebling of an award of defendants’ profits, but only for an award of
246
treble the plaintiff’s “actual damages.”
The court then observed
247
the sole fact that
that, under applicable Tenth Circuit law,
defendants’ actions were willful was insufficient to invoke the court’s
more general power to remedy an “inadequate” recovery under
section 35 of the Lanham Act because a showing of willfulness was a
248
prerequisite to an award of any of the defendants’ profits.
B. Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp.
The second of these cases presented a much more straightforward
249
issue. In Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp., the Federal Circuit
considered whether an award of monetary sanctions against
238. No. 02-1361, 2003 WL 2008072, at *5 (Fed. Cir. May 1, 2003).
239. Id. at *1.
240. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
241. See Nutting, 2003 WL 2008072, at *2 (noting that the plaintiff also sued for
infringement of trade dress and violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act).
242. Id.
243. See id. (noting that the total amount of the award came to over $1.1 million).
244. Id. at *4.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
246. Nutting, 2003 WL 2008072, at *3.
247. Id. (discussing controlling Tenth Circuit case law as it relates to the review of
damage awards).
248. Id. at *5.
249. 334 F.3d 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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trademark plaintiffs was appropriate under section 35 of the Lanham
250
The district court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ trademark
Act.
claims and awarded sanctions against the plaintiffs because they did
not yet possess a federally registered trademark when they filed their
251
action alleging infringement of their mark “BATTSCAN.”
In
reversing this award, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
misunderstood the governing law and thus abused its discretion in
252
awarding sanctions. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had sued
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which provides a remedy for
unregistered, as well as registered marks, and sanctions for this suit
253
were therefore inappropriate.
IX. INSUFFICIENCY OF USE
254

One unpublished case in 2003, Lowell International Co. v. Quimby,
discussed the common question of sufficiency of use: when has an
applicant made enough trademark use to establish priority for
255
purposes of an opposition?
In Lowell, the applicant sought
registration of “1-800-REFERRAL” for certain information-related
services and William Quimby opposed on likelihood of confusion
256
grounds.
The parties stipulated as to likelihood of confusion; the
257
In sustaining Quimby’s opposition,
only issue was priority of use.
the Board observed that Lowell produced only two solicitation letters
258
as evidence of use.
Although testimony of a single witness (here
applicant) could sometimes be probative, the Board found the
applicant’s testimony as to his continuous use of his mark to be
259
“inconsistent, contradictory and vague.”
Reviewing the Board’s
findings of fact under the “substantial evidence” standard, the
260
Federal Circuit agreed with these findings.
Thus, the court’s

250. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000).
251. See Waymark, 334 F.3d at 1360-62, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305-07.
252. See id. at 1366, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309 (noting further that its reversal
of the district court’s decision was not intended as a criticism since Waymark’s
briefing on the matter “was at best confusing”).
253. See id. at 1363-64, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307-08.
254. No. 02-1392, 2003 WL 21318662 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2003).
255. Id. at *3.
256. Id. at *1.
257. See id. (explaining that in determining priority of use, the Board sought to
resolve whether Lowell could prove that he used his “1-800-REFERRAL” mark before
Quimby first used his similar mark in May 1997).
258. See id. at *2 (pointing out that these solicitation letters, to the Dental Society
of New York and the Florida Bar, did not result in any form of participation
agreement).
259. Id.
260. Id. at *3.
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decision signaled the importance of corroborating evidence when
establishing priority of use.
X. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
In addition to tackling numerous substantive matters, the Federal
Circuit also clarified procedural points in two cases that criticized the
Board’s handling of some technical issues and approved of its
handling of others.
A. Custom Computer Services, Inc. v. Paychex Properties, Inc.
261

In Custom Computer Services, Inc. v. Paychex Properties, Inc., the
Federal Circuit considered whether the Board had properly
interpreted and applied the federal regulation governing untimely
262
filed oppositions.
In this case, the would-be opposer, The Payroll
People, Inc., filed two extensions of time to oppose registration of the
263
mark “PAY-AS-YOU-GO.” Although these extensions were granted,
Payroll People’s counsel mistakenly filed its extensions on behalf of
“Custom Computer Services, Inc.” formerly known as Payroll People,
when Payroll People had not, in fact, changed its name or previously
264
been known as Custom Computer Services, Inc.
When Payroll
People finally filed an opposition, the Board rejected it, holding that
Payroll People should not have the benefit of the granted extensions
because its counsel’s error was not the sort of “mistake” in the “form
of the potential opposer’s name” that, according to 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.102(b), would allow a party wrongly identified in an extension
265
request to pursue an opposition.
The Federal Circuit reversed and held that the Board improperly
266
The court began by quoting the
interpreted section 2.102(b).
regulation in its entirety, specifically noting that, with respect to
requests for extension of time to file an opposition, the potential
opposer’s failure to provide its “name” may be excused if the failure
was the result of “misidentifi[cation] through mistake” or if the
“opposition is filed in the name of a person in privity with the person

261. 337 F.3d 1334, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1638 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
262. See id. at 1336-37, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640.
263. Id. at 1335, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
264. See id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639 (explaining that while the two
companies were separate entities, one of Payroll People’s founders was also the
owner of Custom Computer).
265. Id. at 1336, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
266. See id. at 1337, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640 (noting that while the Board’s
interpretation of the term “mistake” was reasonable, its application of that
interpretation in the instant case was not supported by substantial evidence).
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267

who requested and was granted the extension of time.” The court
determined that section 2.102(b)’s use of the disjunctive “or” meant
that the potential opposer need not demonstrate both that its name
was misidentified by mistake and that it was in privity with the named
268
potential opposer. Since the Board had required Payroll People to
show privity and had not pointed to any evidence that there was
269
misidentification through mistake, the court reversed.
B. Central Manufacturing Co. v. Casablanca Industries, Inc.
The hotly contested case Central Manufacturing Co. v. Casablanca
270
Industries, Inc. entailed a number of procedural and substantive
issues. Here, Central Manufacturing filed a petition for cancellation
of the “STEALTH” mark for ceiling fans while the original registrant
271
was in bankruptcy. Before the petition was answered, Central filed
272
Shortly thereafter, the Hunter
a motion for summary judgment.
Fan Company acquired the “STEALTH” registration and moved for
273
an extension of time to answer the petition.
At this point, the
Board suspended proceedings due to the pending summary
274
Although
judgment motion, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d).
Central filed a motion for default and another summary judgment
motion, the Board denied both and required Central to file an
275
amended petition. After Central filed its amended petition, it again
276
moved for default after Hunter filed its answer.
Hunter replied
with sworn affidavits that the parties had agreed that Hunter could
277
While Central contested this characterization,
file at a later time.
278
the Board ultimately denied the default motion.
More motions
followed, eventually leading the Board to require that Central seek
279
Additionally, Central’s
leave before filing more pretrial motions.
four notices of reliance eventually were excluded on evidentiary
267. Id. at 1336-37, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640.
268. Id. at 1337, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640.
269. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640.
270. No. 03-1294, 2003 WL 22977469 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2003) (per curiam).
271. Id. at *1.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d) (2002) (providing that “When a party files . . .
a motion for summary judgment, or any other motion which is potentially dispositive
of a proceeding, the case will be suspended by the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board with respect to all matters not germane to the motion . . . .”).
275. See Central, 2003 WL 22977469, at *1 (indicating that the amended petition
required a greater degree of specificity).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at *2.
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280

grounds.
Based on the lack of evidence in the record, the Board
281
denied Central’s cancellation petition.
The Federal Circuit approved of the Board’s rulings regarding the
282
cancellation proceeding.
The court first held that the Board
correctly excluded the notices of reliance because they included
283
Next, the court
unauthenticated evidence as well as hearsay.
rejected Central’s argument that the Board applied strict procedural
rules to Central and lenient rules to Hunter regarding Central’s
284
various motions and evidentiary issues.
Central’s argument that
Hunter provided insufficient evidence of prior use and lack of
likelihood of confusion was rejected because the court found that
285
Central “misapprehend[ed]” the burden of proof.
Finally, the
court held that the Board correctly determined that the “STEALTH”
mark was suggestive and that the requirement that Central seek leave
286
prior to filing further motions was proper.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s decisions in 2003 provided practitioners with
both new precedent and guidelines regarding long-standing
standards. While most of the decisions remained loyal to precedent,
the
opinions
regarding
scandalous
and
geographically
misdescriptively deceptive marks marked important changes. The
Federal Circuit’s trademark decisions have thus provided important
substantive guidance for trademark lawyers and their clients.

280. See id. (explaining that the court excluded the evidence as untimely because
it was proffered during the rebuttal instead of being properly introduced during the
plaintiff’s case-in-chief).
281. Id.
282. Id. at *3.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at *4.

